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Abstract
The  empathy-altruism hypothesis  postulates  that  the  awareness  of  others’  need,  pain,  or  distress  increases
empathetic  feelings,  which  in  turn  triggers  cooperative  behaviour.  Although  some  evidence  supports  this
hypothesis,  previous  studies  were  prone  to  the  ‘experimenter  demand  effects’  raising  concerns  about  the
interpretation of  the results.  To avoid this issue,  we designed a laboratory experiment  where  we examined
whether the presence of individuals with a genuine physical disability would increase group cooperation in a
public  goods  game.  By  manipulating  the  group  composition  during  a  social  dilemma,  we  created  a  more
ecologically valid environment closer to real-life interactions. Our results showed that the presence of physically
disabled individuals did not affect group cooperation. Specifically, their presence did not affect the contributions
of their physically abled partners. The lack of a surge in cooperative behaviour questions the interpretation of
previous studies and suggests that they may be explained by an experimenter demand effect. Alternatively, our
results may also suggest that in the context of a social dilemma with real stakes, people with physical disabilities
are not perceived as being in need or do not induce enough empathy to overweight the cost of cooperation and
trigger cooperative behaviours.
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Introduction
There  is  overwhelming evidence from laboratory and field  experiments  that  genetically  unrelated
individuals cooperate despite individual costs and a lack of perceived benefits (Rand and Nowak,
2013). While many scholars argue that the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas is determined
by structural variables, including group size (Barcelo & Capraro, 2015), the marginal benefit received
(Nosenzo et al., 2015), monitoring techniques (Ostrom et al., 1992), and the information available to
participants  (McAuliffe  et  al.,  2019),  others  claim that  individual  psychological  factors  are  more
pertinent (Kirman & Teschl, 2010). 
One potential psychological factor could be empathy, which is generally defined as the capacity to put
oneself in someone else’s shoes and thus be concerned for another person’s position (Hoffman, 1975).
The  idea  that  empathy is  a  major  determinant  of  prosocial  behaviour  is  widely  accepted  among
psychologists (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Batson & Moran, 1999; Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson,
Lishner & Stocks, 2015) and it has furthermore been revived in economics with the development of
behavioural economics (Bowles & Gintis, 2003; Camerer, 2003). For example, the empathy-altruism
hypothesis postulates that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation (Batson, 1987).1 
Although widely accepted,  the  existing empirical  evidence on the effect  of  empathy-induction on
prosocial behaviour is however sparse. Batson and Moran (1999) were one of the first to investigate
empathy-induced altruism as a motive for cooperation in the context of a social dilemma. They placed
60 undergraduate  women in  a  fictitious,  one-trial  prisoner’s  dilemma.  To  induce  empathy,  some
participants read a note revealing a need for cheering up from their partners. They found that the
participants in the empathy-induction condition behaved more cooperatively than the participants in
the control condition.2 More recently, Klimecki et al. (2016) conducted a within-subject experiment
where they compared subjects’ decisions in the standard one-shot dictator game with a novel version,
the so-called empathic dictator game. In the latter version of the game, empathy was elicited through
the presentation of videos depicting a suffering person in need: a helpless child in an orphanage. All
subjects participated first in the standard dictator game, followed by the empathic version. In line with
the empathy-altruism hypothesis,  the authors observed significantly higher donations to unfamiliar
individuals  in  the  empathic  version  of  the  game  compared  to  the  standard  one.  Notwithstanding
Klimecki et al.’s contribution to the literature, as well as the earlier works on the topic summarized in
Batson, Lishner and Stocks (2015), the use of videos (pictures or messages) for empathy induction is a
design choice that is prone to what has been called “experimenter demand effects” (EDE) (Zizzo,
1 As  Batson,  Lishner  and  Stocks  (2015)  note,  empathy  may  “include  feelings  of  sympathy,  compassion,
softheartedness, tenderness, sorrow, sadness, upset, distress, concern, and grief” and is other-oriented. 
2 In an earlier study, Batson et al. (1995) investigated whether feeling empathy for another member of the collective
in a social  dilemma would create an altruistic desire to allocate resources to that person as an individual,  reducing the
collective good. They used the same procedure as in Batson and Moran (1999) for empathy induction. 
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2010).  EDE  refer  to  changes  in  behaviour  by  the  subjects  due  to  cues  about  what  constitutes
appropriate behaviour. EDE can be social or purely cognitive and are a potential problem as they may
be  associated  with  the  experimental  objectives.  Studies  using  videos  or  photographs  of  people
suffering  in  a  within-subject  experiment  are  thus  problematic  since  subjects  can  easily  infer  the
experimental objectives and behave according to what they think the experimenters expect from them
which in turn may bias the results. These effects are often connected to Milgram’s (1974) experiment
and to the Hawthorne factory experiments where higher productivity seemed to occur when workers
were the object of a study (Mayo, 1933). 
While we acknowledge that EDE cannot be entirely ruled out when studying the empathy-altruism
hypothesis, we proposed an experimental design aiming minimizing the relevance or plausibility of
EDE based criticism. We designed a controlled laboratory experiment where we examined whether the
presence of  individuals  with  a  genuine  and conspicuous  physical  disability  would increase group
cooperation  in  the  context  of  a  public  goods  game with  real  stakes.  By  manipulating  the  group
composition during a social dilemma game, we created a more ecologically valid environment closer
to real-life interactions between persons with and without visible physical disabilities reducing the
likelihood for subjects to infer the experimental objectives. Further, our experimental settings enable
us  to  test  whether  the  presence  of  physically  disabled  individuals  influences  cooperativeness  of
physically abled individuals both after a brief exposure (mimicrying previous studies using only video
or  pictures  of  person  in  need)  and  during  real  cooperative  interactions.  The  empathy-altruism
hypothesis  would  predict  that  the  presence  of  physically  disabled  individuals  would  increase
cooperation by inducing higher contributions from the physically abled individuals and that this effect
would be stronger during real cooperative interactions than after a brief exposure. In addition, because
there is evidence within the empathy-altruism literature, that women express more empathic feelings
then men (Rueckert & Naybar, 2008), we can also predict that the presence of a physically disabled
person would affect more women’s than men’s cooperative behaviour. However, because EDE may
have inflated the results of previous studies, we predict that the presence of a physically disabled
person will have a less strong effect on cooperation (if any) in our setting compared to the effect of
stimuli implemented in previous studies (e.g., pictures, videos, direct messages).
Materials & Methods
Experimental method
To study cooperation, we used what has become the benchmark for experimental research on social
dilemmas: the public goods game (Ledyard, 1995). The public goods game represents a stylized model
of a community in which each person’s wellbeing depends on own and other persons’ contributions.
3
Individually, each member is best off if s/he contributes nothing and relies on others’ efforts to create
social benefits by behaving cooperatively. 
Participants in our game were assigned to groups of four and endowed with 20 tokens. They had to
choose how to allocate this endowment between a public account and a private account. Each token
left on the private account yielded to the subject a benefit of 1 Experimental Currency Unit (ECU). In
addition to the ECU kept on the private account, each group member received a fixed benefit of 0.5
ECU from each token invested in the public account by any group member. From these parameters it
follows that the utilitarian optimum and the efficient symmetric outcome is for all group members to
contribute  their  entire  endowments  to  the  public  account.  However,  under  these specifications,  it
nonetheless remains in each individual’s self-interest to contribute zero.  
At the outset of each session, participants were informed that the central server would allocate them
randomly to groups of four people. We employed partner matching to mimic real-world situations in
which the same group members interact repeatedly (e.g.,  in the workplace), so group assignments
remained the same for the entire session. Each session consisted of ten periods. The number of periods
was common knowledge, as was the fact that participants’ decisions and identity were anonymous
during the game. Each period was divided in two steps. First subjects had to decide on the allocation
of the 20 tokens between their private and the public account. Second, subjects were informed about
the total contribution of their group and their payoff for the current period. At the end of the ten round
public goods game, participants answered a short questionnaire (age, gender, level of study, current
occupation (student or not), study discipline).
In two sessions,  we recruited participants  from the student  population at  the University  of  XXX,
France, to play ten periods of a standard public goods game in groups of four individuals,  which
corresponds to our baseline. Students were invited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015), from a
pool of more than 3,000 volunteers, to participate in an experiment at the Laboratory XXXX. Forty
subjects  (57.50% males)  participated in  the  baseline sessions.  They were all  physically  valid  and
23.58 (SD = 3.66) years old on average. None of them had previously participated in a public goods
game or a game with similar parameters.  
In other eight sessions, in addition to the students’ population (N = 112), we recruited 16 participants
with visible physical disabilities. Most of the latter who participated in our experiment suffered from
multiple sclerosis. They were all in wheelchairs, which made their disability conspicuous to others.
The participants with physical disabilities were recruited from local associations and at the annual
meeting of the national association of persons with multiple sclerosis, which took place in XX, France
on May 2017. At the recruitment stage, they received similar information to the student population. It
is worth noting that the 16 participants (50% males) with physical disability were older (M = 53.44,
SD = 10.37 years) than the other participants in the same sessions (M = 22.54, SD = 6.26 years; 51%
males). 
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In each of these eight sessions, we had two participants with visible physical disability and fourteen
participants  with no (visible)  physical  disability,  which made 4 groups of  4  in  each session.  The
sixteen participants were randomly seated at one of the terminals (terminals were separated by lateral
partitions to ensure complete anonymity), as in the baseline. They received identical instructions to the
baseline.  The  only  difference  with  the  baseline  sessions  is  that  at  the  group formation  stage  the
computer  randomly allocated the two participants  with visible  physical  disability  to  two different
groups  where  the  other  3  participants  had  no  visible  physical  disability  and  this  was  common
knowledge. That is, for each participant we displayed the following information on the participant’s
computer screen: “There are two groups where there is one person with physical disability. In your
group, there is one person with physical disability (or alternatively, in your group there is no one with
physical disability).” Hence, in each of the eight sessions, half of the groups were what we will further
refer to as mixed groups (i.e. groups composed of one participant with visible physical disability and
three participants with no visible physical disability), and the other half were non-mixed groups. The
comparison between contribution decisions in the baseline and in the non-mixed groups will allow us
to identify the effect on cooperation from a brief exposure to persons with visible physical disability
before the start  of the public goods game. The comparison between mixed groups and non-mixed
groups will tell us whether cooperation is affected by the interaction with a physically disabled person
in the group. 
Overall,  participants in the experiment earned an average of 14.64 € (SD = 2.57€) for one hour of
participation, including initial instructions and payment of participants. 
Statistical analyses
We first examined whether the level of contributions to the public good differed between physically
disabled and abled participants.  To do this,  we used a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test  to
compare the average contributions to the public account across the 10 rounds of the game between the
two participant categories within the mixed groups. In addition, we investigated whether the dynamics
of contributions over time differed between the two categories. We thus used a linear mixed model
with the individual’s contribution to the public account in a given round as the response variable. Our
explanatory variable was the participant’s category (physically disabled versus abled) and we included
the variable ‘round’ and its interaction with the participant’s category. Finally, ‘participant ID’ nested
within ‘group ID’ were included as random factors to account for the individual’s repeated measures
and their non-independence within groups.
Second, we investigated whether the game conditions influenced cooperation in a group. We used a
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test by ranks to examine whether average contributions across the 10
rounds differed between the three types of groups (baseline groups,  non-mixed groups and mixed
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groups). We also used a linear mixed model to examine the dynamics of the groups’ contributions
over time. The response variable was the group’s contribution to the public account in a given round.
Our  key  explanatory  variable  was  the  group’s  type  and  we  include  the  variable  ‘round’  and  its
interaction with the group’s type. We also included ‘group ID’ as a random factor to account for the
repeated measures across rounds.
Finally, we investigated whether and how game conditions influenced individual contributions to the
public account of physically abled participants. Analyses were performed separately for each gender.
We used a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test by ranks to examine whether the individual average
contributions differed between the three types of groups. Then, we used linear mixed models with the
individual’s contribution to the public account in a given round as the response variable to investigate
whether  group’s  type  influences  the  pattern  of  individual  contributions  across  rounds.  The  key
explanatory variable was the group’s type, as in the previous model, and we also included the variable
‘round’ and its interaction with the group’s type. The interaction was removed from the models when
it did not significantly influence the response variable. We also included participant’s age as a control
variable. Finally, ‘participant ID’ nested within ‘group ID’ were included as random factors to account
for the individual’s repeated measures and their non-independence within groups.
All  analyses were conducted using R 3.4.2.  Linear mixed models were performed using the lmer
function of the lme4 package. 
Results
Contributions of physically disabled and non-physically disabled participants
Within  the  mixed  groups,  the  average  contribution  to  the  public  account  across  the  10  rounds
significantly differed between the two participant  categories  (Wilcoxon rank-sum test:  U (N = 64)
= 27.0, p = .03): physically disabled participants contributed significantly more (M = 12.20, SD = 5.78
tokens, N = 16) than physically abled participants (M =9.57, SD = 7.12 tokens,  N = 48). This was
supported by the linear mixed model (Table S1) finding a significant effect of the interaction between
participants’ categories and rounds (X2 (1, N = 640) = 26.81, p < .0001) suggesting that contributions
of non-physically disabled participants decreased over time (β= -0.61, SE = 0.07, 95% CI = [-0.74;-
0.48]), while this is not the case for the physically disabled participants (β = 0.09, SE  = 0.11, 95%
CI = [-0.13;-0.32]) (Fig. 1). 
The effect of physically disabled participants on group contributions  
The average contribution to the public account was not significantly different (Kruskall-Wallis test by
ranks: H (2,  N = 42) = 1.54, p = .46) between the baseline groups (M = 36.37,  SD = 17.74 tokens,
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N = 10), the non-mixed groups (40.90 ± 18.09 tokens, N = 16), and the mixed groups (M = 33.75,
SD = 18.90 tokens, N = 16). Although the linear mixed model showed a marginally significant effect
of  the  interaction  between  group’s  type  and  rounds  (X2 (2,  N = 420) = 6.04,  p = .05;  Table  S2),
contributions decreased over time for all three types of groups (baseline: β = -1.86, SE = 0.32, 95%
CI = [-2.50;-1.22];  non-mixed groups:  β = -2.58,  SE = 0.26,  95% CI = [-3.09;-2.08];  mixed groups:
β = -1.74,  SE = 0.26,  95% CI = [-2.24;-1.23])  (Fig.  2).  Post-hoc  analyses  comparing  contributions
between the three types of groups two-by-two showed that contributions in mixed groups decreased
significantly less sharply than in non-mixed groups (β = 0.84, SE = 0.36, t = 2.32, p = .05). No other
significant difference was found (all p > .18).  
The effect  of  physically  disabled  participants  on  individual  contributions  across  the
three conditions
Men’s (baseline groups (M ± SD): 11.54 ± 7.05 tokens; non-mixed groups: 10.09 ± 7.20 tokens, mixed
groups: 10.48 ± 7.35 tokens) and women’s (baseline groups: 7.29 ± 6.21 tokens; non-mixed groups:
6.98 ± 6.38 tokens, mixed groups: 9.95 ± 6.38 tokens) average contributions to the public account did
not  differ  between the three conditions (Kruskall-Wallis test by ranks, men: H (2, N = 72) = 0.23,
p = .89; women: X2 (2, N = 80) = 2.46, p = .29). The linear mixed models were performed without the
interaction between group’s type and rounds as this interaction did not significantly influence men’s
(X2 (2, N = 720) = 3.39, p = .18) and women’s (X2 (2, N = 800) = 2.74, p = .25) contributions to the
public account.  The models (Table S3) did not  find any evidence that  the presence of physically
disabled  participants  influenced  men’s  (X2  (2,  N = 720) = 0.83,  df = 2,  p = .66)  and  women’s
contributions (X2 (2, N = 800) = 1.79, p = .41) to the public account (Fig.3). Both men’s and women’s
contributions significantly decreased over rounds (men: X2 (1, N = 720) = 72.17, p < .0001; women:
X2 (1,  N = 800) = 130.31,  p < .0001).  Finally,  age  significantly  influences  women’s  (X2 (1,
N = 800) = 20.14, p < .0001) but not men’s contributions (X2 (1, N = 720) = 0.01, p = .96). 
Discussion
The  empathic-altruism  hypothesis  suggests  that  empathic  concern  produces  altruistic  motivation
(Batson,  1987).  Although  there  is  a  large  range  of  evidence  supporting  the  empathic-altruism
hypothesis (for a review see: Batson, Lishner & Stocks, 2015), previous empirical studies conducted
so  far  may  suffer  from  the  experimenter  demand  effects  (EDE)  potentially  inflating  the  results
obtained. By minimizing the relevance or plausibility of EDE, we experimentally tested whether the
exposure to physically disabled persons would increase one’s cooperative behaviours in the context of
a public goods game with real stakes. Contrary to the empathic-altruism hypothesis, our results find no
significant effect from the exposure to a physically disabled person on other’s cooperative behaviours.
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Our findings question the interpretation of the results from previous studies and highlight the need to
control for the experimenter demand effects in future investigations. 
Our  results  indicate  that  both  a  brief  exposure  to  or  a  real  interaction  with  physically  disabled
individuals  do  not  significantly  affect  the  contributions  to  the  public  good  of  physically  abled
participants.  In  addition,  the  presence  of  physically  disabled  individuals  did  not  influence  the
dynamics of groups’ contributions: group’s contribution decreased over time in the three experimental
conditions, as it is classically observed in standard public goods game (Chaudhuri, 2011). Although
the results did find that dynamics of groups’ contributions over time differ between mixed- and non-
mixed  group’s,  this  effect  is  merely  due  to  physically  disabled  participants’  behaviours.  Indeed,
physically disabled participants contributed significantly more to the public good than physically abled
participants  and  their  contributions  did  not  decrease  over  time  (this  higher  cooperativeness  from
physically-disabled participants is however difficult to interpret since the former participants are older,
on average, than the physically abled ones). 
Hence,  our results  did not  find any evidence supporting the empathic-altruism hypothesis.  This is
surprising considering the extant literature showing that in both humans and animals the willingness to
incur a cost for others to receive a benefit is higher when the others are in need, pain, or distress
(Batson et al., 2015, de Waal, 2007; Klimecki et al., 2016). Previous research has also shown that
compassion, which denotes a feeling of care for a suffering other accompanied by the desire to help,
motivates cooperative behaviour (Saslow et al., 2013). The lack of a surge in the desire to behave
more prosocially in the presence of a physically disabled person may indicate that the latter do not
invoke  enough  feelings  of  compassion  or  empathy  in  economically  constrained  environments  to
overweight the cost of cooperation and increase prosocial behaviour. This observation, in turn, can be
interpreted as evidence that in such environments physically disabled individuals are not considered to
be more in need, pain or distress than individuals without any visible physical disability. 
A different, although complementary, explanation for our results has to do with the method that we
used  in  this  experiment  to  study  behavioural  reactions  to  the  presence  of  physically  disabled
individuals. Contrary to studies that show a positive correlation between one’s exposure to a person in
need, pain or distress and his/her prosocial behaviour, we did not use photographs, videos or messages
to induce empathy in our participants. Indeed, such a method suffers from potential bias such as the
experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010). Instead, we implemented a more realistic environment
with groups composed of participants with and without a conspicuous physical disability interacting in
the public goods game under identical conditions, similarly to real-life interactions between these two
categories. Hence, the fact we did not observed any effect of their presence question the interpretation
of previous studies for which the EDE may have biased participant’s behaviours to the experimental
conditions.  It  paves  the  way  for  further  studies  investigating  the  empathic-altruism  hypothesis
controlling for the EDE. 
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It is worth-noting that while the use of physically disabled persons renders the environment within
which the participants interact more realistic since it may seem natural that these people came to the
lab to participate in an experiment (which may happen on any regular day in the lab), this may also
represent a limit of our study because there is a disconnection between physical disability and the need
for money that can be earned if the group members behave cooperatively. However, our results are
unlikely to be explained only by this disconnection as some previous studies supporting the empathic-
altruism hypothesis also used economic games.  In addition,  there is  evidence that  an individual’s
cooperativeness during economic games is related to his/her cooperativeness in other type of settings
including in  daily-life  contexts  (Peysakhovich,  Nowak & Rand,  2014;  Fehr  & Leibbrandt,  2011).
Therefore, we expect that empathic concerns for physically disabled individuals would also trigger
cooperative behaviours during economic games. 
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Figures
Fig.1. Average contributions over the 10 rounds for the physically disabled participants (black)
versus  the  non-physically  disabled  participants  (grey).  Raw data  are  shown in  dotted lines.
Predicted values are shown in solid lines. 
Fig. 2. Average contributions over the 10 rounds in mixed groups (black), non-mixed groups
(dark grey) and baseline groups (light grey).  Raw data are shown in dotted lines.  Predicted
values are shown in solid lines. 
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Fig. 3. Men’s (left) and women’s (right) average contributions to the public account over the
rounds in mixed groups (black), non-mixed groups (dark grey) and baseline groups (light grey).
Raw data are shown in dotted lines. Predicted values are shown in solid lines.
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